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Japan suffered a very high inflation rate in 1973-74.  The CPI inflation rate rose to near 30% in 1974,
the highest rate in the postwar Japanese history after the chaotic hyperinflation following the end of
the Second World War. Traditionally, the oil crisis is blamed for the 1973-74 high inflation. However,
due to monetary policy decisions in 1972-73, the inflation rate had already exceeded 10% before the
onset of the oil crisis in October 1973.  These decisions include the interest rate cut of June 1972 and
the interest rate hike of April 1973, which in retrospect proved too small.  Concern about the rapid
yen appreciation produced political pressure on the Bank of Japan to continue easing. The Bank of
Japan came out of the Great Inflation of 1973 with a stronger voice.  The Bank successfully argued
that its recommendation to tighten monetary policy should not be overruled or the high inflation would
be repeated.  By this logic, the Bank of Japan obtained /de facto/ independence after 1975.  When
faced with the next economic recovery in 1979, again accompanied by oil price increases, the Bank
of Japan was able to tighten monetary policy and to contain the inflation rate under 10 percent.  The
interest rate in the 1972-75 period  was well below, by as much as 25 percentage points in 1973, the
interest rate suggested by a modified monthly Taylor rule regression.
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1.  Introduction 
When the new Meiji government was established in 1868, after overturning 260 years 
of the Tokugawa Shogun rule, it had to quickly build many legal institutions, such as 
Constitution, Democracy, the Diet (parliament), Commercial law and Criminal Law, as 
well as modern economic and social infrastructure, such as a banking system, railways, 
and a postal system. 
  The Bank of Japan was born in 1882, only after the new Meiji government 
experimented unsuccessfully a transplanting of the national banking system (without a 
central bank) from the United States.    The government, after some unpleasant inflation 
under  the national banking system,  decided to adopt the central banking system 
modeled after the  Belgium central bank.  During more than 125  years of its 
uninterrupted history, the Bank of Japan saw three episodes of high inflation, defined by 
more than 20 percent of CPI inflation rate: (1) 1917-1919, the WW I years; (2) 1945-49, 
immediately after the end of WW II; and (3) 1973-74, the first oil crisis.
2  The first 
episode reflected the export boom during WW I.
3
The main focus of this paper is to examine the third episode of high inflation, 
when the CPI inflation rate remained above 10 percent from May 1973 to September 
1975,  with a spike up to 23  percent  in  1974. (The inflation rate is defined as the 
percentage increase of CPI over the same month of the preceding year.) 
    The second episode, when prices 
increased more than 200 times in a few years, was a result of the devastation of 
productive capacity and deficit financing cum monetization, which followed the end of 
WW II.    So the 1973-74 was the only example of high inflation unrelated to a war that 
Japan was involved. 
It is commonly argued that the oil crisis was  the culprit to blame for the 
1973-75 high inflation. However, the inflation rate has reached already 10% several 
months before the Middle East crisis, which occurred in October 1973.
4
Reasons for the great inflation of 1973-74 are the followings.  First, in late 
  The oil crisis 
only aggravated, though  very badly, an  inflationary spiral that had been already in 
progress. 
                                                  
2  This can be taken as support to a view that, in the very long run, monetary discipline 
has been maintained in Japan since 1880s, except for a few episodes. A more direct test 
of monetary neutrality in the long run was carried out by Oi et al. (2004). 
3  Shizume (2002) examines monetary policy in the interwar period, using the Taylor rule. He 
concludes that monetary policy was amplifying rather than mitigating domestic cycles due to 
consideration to the stability of the exchange rate, throughout the periods under the gold standard, 
1897-1913 and 1930-31, and managed exchange rate regime, 1913-1929, and after 1932.   
4  Seminal work that pointed out that monetary easing, or excess liquidity, existed 
before the oil price jump of October 1973 were Komiya (1976), Komiya (1988, Ch.8) and 
Komiya and Yasui (1984).   4 
1972, the Bank of Japan underestimated the strength of the economy and potential of 
prices to rise quickly.  Second, there was a strong resistance  against  yen 
revaluation/appreciation.  This was particularly true between December 1971, when 
the Smithsonian Agreement was reached, and February 1973, when the yen was finally 
floated.  The  pressure for appreciation  prompted interventions by the monetary 
authorities in terms of selling yen, which added yen liquidity to the market, promoting 
inflation.  Politicians also voiced their dislike of yen appreciation, and some of them 
were calling for stopping yen appreciation at any cost.  The Bank lowered the official 
discount rate (ODR)—that was the policy rate then—in June 1972, when recovery in 
output had already become obvious.    Third, Mr. Kakuei Tanaka became Prime Minister 
(PM) in July 1972, advocating large fiscal spending.  There was strong pressure from 
his government to keep the interest rate from rising.  It was a regular practice in the 
1960s and 1970s that any interest rate change was subject to preliminary discussion 
with and a tacit approval of the government and Prime Minister, before actually being 
decided in the  Policy Board (in charge of monetary  policy).  The Monetary Policy 
Committee was not functioning as an independent decision making body at all. (Details 
of pressure from politicians will be explained in later sections.)   
With political pressure, it was not until April 1973 that the ODR was raised. By 
that time, the CPI inflation rate was exceeding 9%. The first three, out of five, interest 
rate hikes in 1973 were too little and too late. By the time of the oil price hike of 
October 1973, the fight against inflation had been already lost. Both headline and core 
CPI inflation rates rose above 20% by the beginning of 1974. 
A panic-like chaos resulting from high inflation in 1974 finally convinced the 
Bank and politicians to apply strong tightening.
5  The ODR was raised from 4.25% to 
9%, in five steps, in 1973.  However, the interest rate level stayed well below the 
inflation rate throughout this episode. The real interest rate, measured by the difference 
between ODR and CPI headline inflation rate, was on average minus 5.6% in 1973, and 
minus 14.1% in 1974.
6
There are three possible hypotheses to explain the Bank’s soft stance toward 
inflation.  The first  hypothesis is that the Bank of Japan did not know that the 
  Disinflation in 1974 was accompanied by a sharp output 
decline, a great sacrifice. The negative growth rate of 1974 was the first since 1950. 
                                                  
5  Wholesalers were believed to have bought and hoarded goods.    Consumers also bought in bulk to 
guard themselves from future inflation.    These actions shrank supply quickly and contributed to 
further price increases.    One widely reported story was that toilet papers would be missing from 
store shelves, and that consumers in a panic rushed to supermarkets to purchase toilet 
paper—clearing the store selves indeed. 
6  Even when the overnight call rate was used instead of ODR, the real interest rate was minus 4.4% 
in 1973 and minus 10.6% in 1974.   5 
inflationary pressure was building in the economy.  Examination of a memoire 
(Nakagawa (1981)) and the Bank historical archives (Bank of Japan (1986)) reveal that 
this was probably not the case.
7
After the 1973-74 episode of high inflation that at least partly was due to a 
mistake of the Bank of Japan, one might think that the Bank of Japan would have been 
discredited. On the contrary, the Bank came out of the episode with a stronger voice.  
The Bank has argued that if its recommendation to tighten monetary policy was to be 
overruled, the tragic experiences of 1972-73 would be repeated.  With this logic, the 
Bank of Japan obtained de facto independence.  The ODR was raised much earlier in 
1979-80, the second oil crisis, than in 1973. Even more remarkable here was that the 
ODR was raised during the months of a budget debate in the Diet—between January 
and March—which up to that time was politically inconceivable.
  The second hypothesis is that the Bank of Japan knew 
that the inflationary risk was rising, but did not seek tightening in time because of a fear 
of being turned down.    The third hypothesis is that although the Bank of Japan knew of 
the risk and attempted to tighten, the  tightening  proposal was rejected by the 
government.  The relationship with the government (esp. Prime Ministers as well as 
Finance Ministers) in 1972-73 holds a clue.    A close examination of the events reveals 
that the truth is somewhere between the second and third hypothesis. 
8
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 120 
year history of inflation in Japan.  Section 3 describes the economic  events  and 
political developments as well as monetary policy actions, which resulted in Great 
Inflation of 1972-74.    The monetary policy during this period is considered to be a 
mistake.
  The real interest 
rate remained positive in 1979-80, in contrast to being hugely negative, in 1973-74. The 
real interest rate measured by the difference between the ODR and CPI headline 
inflation rate was on average 1% in 1979 and 0.4% in 1980; while the real interest rate 
of the call rate was 2.2% in 1979 and 3.2% in 1980.  As a result, even with sharp oil 
price increases in 1979-80, the inflation rate in Japan remained moderate, peaking at 
8.7%. 
9
                                                  
7  Nelson (2007), relying on Newspaper articles, described the policy debate in the 
1970s. 
  Section 4 describes why the Bank of Japan gained monetarist rhetoric and de 
facto  independence after the mistake  of 1972-73. Section 5  reviews no-inflation 
experience during the second oil crisis, 1978-80. Section 6 will be devoted to some 
econometric analysis to substantiate the arguments in the preceding sections.  Section 
8  The reason for the hesitation of ODR changes during the budget process was that it would make 
budget assumptions outdated, while a budget bill could not be changed easily. 
9  See Ito (1992; pp. 125-127) for an earlier description of the “mistake.”   6 
7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Long History 
The yen, as the currency of Japan, was introduced in 1871, and the Bank of Japan was 
established  in 1882.  There  have been three episodes of very high inflation, the 
inflation rate exceeding 20 percent.    Figure 1 shows the CPI inflation rate from 1880 to 
2007 for Japan.  The highest inflation rate during the 125 year history was recorded 
immediately after the WW II. During the WW I, a very high inflation rate was also 
observed. Except for these two World War-related inflation episodes, the inflation rate 
in Japan has been below 10 percent, except the high inflation of 1973-74.  Table 1 
shows the WPI and CPI inflation rates  in the three episodes. Since the two earlier 
episodes are directly related to the World Wars, many factors that defined the inflation 
rates in those years are beyond control of the central bank.  The only interesting 
episode from the viewpoint of monetary policy is the third episode, namely in 1973-74.  
This period will be analyzed in detail in the next section. 
The rest of this section is devoted to an overview of the long history of 
inflation  dynamics  and the associated exchange rate movement.  Most of the 
discussion follows Ito (1997) who examined the yen/dollar exchange rate as well as the 
inflation dynamics of the two countries. When the yen was introduced in 1871, one yen 
had the same gold value as the US dollar. Hence, the exchange rate was 1 yen for 1 
dollar. Legally it was a gold-pegged currency, but in reality, it was convertible to silver.   
Hence, over the following twenty-five years, the yen depreciated steadily against the US 
dollar, mainly reflecting the depreciation of silver against gold. By 1895, 1 US dollar 
was worth 2 yen.  During the de facto silver convertible years, Japanese prices—both 
CPI and WPI—were oscillating between inflation and deflation, the average inflation 
rates of Japan from 1880 to 1896 were 1.1% in terms of the CPI and 2.1% in terms of 
the WPI.  The highest inflation rates were 14.5% for CPI in 1880 (in the wake of the 
Seinan War), 9.0% in WPI in 1896 (in the wake of the Sino-Japan War).   In 1880, the 
inflation rate was high due to the government paying for its  deficits that had been 
caused by fighting and defeating the rebel in the South (an episode known as the Seinan 
War).  This inflation pushed the move toward establishing the Bank of Japan in 1882. 
The WPI inflation rate of Japan in 1896 was high in the wake of the Sino-Japan war of 
1894-95.  The inflation rates in the US were slightly lower than Japan, -0.4% for CPI 
and -1.5% for WPI.  The highest rate was 7.5% for CPI and 11.1% for WPI, both in 
1880.    Although as a silver standard country, Japan experienced a higher inflation rate 
than the United States, the inflation difference was more or less offset by the nominal   7 
depreciation of the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar, so that the real bilateral exchange rate 
was stable. 
Once Japan joined the gold standard club in 1897, it was maintained until WW 
I.  The gold standard then was a significant discipline device against inflation, just as 
theory would suggest.    Japan maintained the gold standard at the rate roughly two yen 
to one dollar.  Since the inflation rate during WW I in Japan was higher than the US, 
attempting to get back to the gold standard at the old parity meant deflationary policy, 
similar to experiences among European countries.  Indeed, the inflation rate was 
mostly negative during the 1920s through 1931. The CPI declined by 19% from 1920 to 
1929, and by 20% from 1929 to 1931. With unfortunate events like the Great Kanto Earth 
Quake of 1923 and the banking crisis of 1927, the timing of getting back to the gold 
standard was put off until January 1930.    The timing of restoring gold standard turned 
out to be the worst, as the world economy, especially the US economy, was heading 
toward the Great Depression.  Japan got off the gold standard only after 22 months in 
December 1931, following many European countries.  The yen/dollar exchange rate 
depreciated quickly as the United States maintained the gold standard until 1933.  It 
did not take too long that the value of the yen in terms of one dollar to became half of 
the gold standard rats, that is, four yen per US dollar.  The rapid depreciation is partly 
due to a rapid adjustment to the level that would restore export competitiveness in the 
wake of European devaluation that preceded Japan’s devaluation by several months, and 
partly due to large fiscal stimulus and an increase in imports.    (See Ito, Okina, and 
Teranishi (1993) for events in detail for the fast depreciation period in 1931-33.) 
Before the WW II, the  nominal  yen depreciated vis-à-vis  the US dollar 
continuously, except for the gold standard periods. However, between 1880 and 1930, 
the changes of the nominal yen/dollar rate were matched with the inflation differentials 
between the two countries, resulting in relatively stable real bilateral exchange rate.  
Much of productive capacity in Japan was destroyed at the last phase of WW II.  
Hyper inflation followed as the country was occupied by the Allied Forces.  Within 
several years, the price level reached almost one hundred times its prewar level.  The 
new yen/dollar rate was fixed in 1949 at 360 yen per dollar. With it, a strong fiscal and 
monetary tightening, known as the Dodge Plan, was introduced by the order of the 
Allied Forces.  The hyper inflation stopped suddenly.  This may be an early example 
of an exchange rate based stabilization policy—later reinvented by the IMF. 
During the Bretton-Woods era, monetary policy was operated to maintain the 
fixed exchange rate. Since significant capital controls existed, monetary policy did have 
some degree of freedom (that is, the interest rate in Japan could be different from that in   8 
the U.S.).  The balance of payments had to be maintained, so that the Bank of Japan 
applied  monetary restraints whenever the booming economy increased imports far 
exceeding exports, depleting foreign reserves.  However, Japan was a diligent student 
of the Bretton-Woods regime.    The rate of 360 yen/dollar was maintained from 1949 
until August 1971.   
During the Bretton-Woods years, the Japanese CPI inflation rate was higher 
than the US CPI, while the Japanese WPI inflation rate was much more comparable to a 
US counterpart.  Comparing the CPI inflation rate, the  Japanese rate was  almost 
double the US rate for each of the 1950s (4.1% in Japan vs. 2.1% in the US) and 1960s 
(5.7% in Japan vs. 2.8% in the US). For the WPI inflation rate the Japanese rate was 
rather close to the US rate: it was higher in Japan in the 1950s (4.2% in Japan vs. 1.7% 
in the US) but reversed in the 1960s (1.3% in Japan vs. 1.7% in the US).  This is a 
strong indication that the Balassa-Samuelson effect was working through the CPI 
inflation differential.    See also Ito (1997) for the discussion and the data source. 
From the 1950s to 1970s, the main monetary policy instrument was the official 
discount rate (ODR), supplemented by reserve ratios (ratios were different for different 
kinds of deposits).  The monetary aggregate growth rate was monitored but not 
emphasized. All deposit rates were under strict controls (until the mid-1980s) and linked 
to the official discount rate.  The bank lending rates to corporations were also 
indirectly controlled.    Total lending amounts were also controlled by the Bank of Japan.   
Commercial banks had to submit lending plans every quarter and results were 
monitored carefully.  The total amount of lending (increases) was controlled for each 
bank.  This practice is called “window guidance.”  Private-sector corporations were 
not allowed to borrow from abroad or had deposits abroad.  All export earning in US 
dollar and other foreign currencies had to be converted into yen and importers had to 
obtain foreign currencies from the Bank of Japan.  Individuals were also under strict 
approvals for obtaining foreign currencies.    No foreign currency deposits were allowed.   
See Ito (1992: Ch. 5) for more detailed description of the transformation of the financial 
markets from a controlled system to a liberalized system gradually in the 1970s and the 
1980s.  (See Ito (1992: p.320) for chronology of capital control deregulations, 
1979-1986; and finally almost all controls were lifted in the “Big Bang” of 1996.)   
 
3.  Great Inflation of 1973-74 
The collapse of the Bretton-Woods regime in August 1971 suddenly freed the Bank of 
Japan from conducting monetary policy solely to maintain the balance of payments by 
3.1. Transition from the Bretton Woods to Free Floating   9 
controlling domestic demands. Theoretically the exchange rate could move freely to 
adjust imports and exports, and the Bank of Japan could concentrate its policy 
objectives to domestic prices.    But, this did not happen, at least, until February 1973.     
After some chaotic trading in the yen/dollar market and gradual appreciation of 
the yen after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods regime, the G10 countries agreed in 
December 1971 to a new parity with a narrow band with fluctuation plus/minus 2.25%. 
The yen had appreciated gradually from 360 yen to 315 yen per dollar by the 
mid-December 1971.  Under the Smithsonian Agreement of December 18, 1971, the 
central rate for the yen/dollar rate was determined, after tough negotiation, to be 308 
yen/dollar,  a  16.88% revaluation (according to the IMF definition) from the 
Bretton-Woods rate of 360 yen/dollar. 
The Smithsonian rate of 308 yen/dollar was regarded by many in Japan as a 
dangerously appreciated yen level. The export industries, particularly shipbuilding, were 
considered  to be vulnerable.    Guarding  against  further appreciation became a new 
national objective. As the yen had stuck at the most appreciated level (ceiling) of the 
Smithsonian band in 1972, monetary policy and fiscal policy were conducted to 
stimulate the domestic economy so that imports would increase and the trade surpluses 
would come down.  Even if inflation would result from increasing domestic demand, 
that would not be a problem, politicians insisted.  Political pressure to keep monetary 
policy relaxed was strong, but no dissenting voice from the Bank of Japan was heard in 
public.   
 
Movements of the inflation rates, CPI and WPI, and the interest rates, ODR and call rate, 
from 1971 to 1975 are shown in Figure 2 where inflation variables are defined as a 
change over the same month of one year earlier.   Table 2 shows Industrial production, 
M2 growth rate, and yen/dollar rate as well as CPI and WPI inflation. There were little 
cautionary signs of inflation until the summer of 1972, the CPI inflation rate being at 
around 5%, and slightly declining, and the WPI inflation rate close to zero. However, 
the WPI started to increase in the summer of 1972, and quickly reached 5%, the level of 
CPI inflation rate, by November 1972. The sharp increase in the WPI was considered to 
be an indication of future inflation in the CPI.   
3.2.    The “mistake”: Overview 
In June 1972, the interest rate was cut to stimulate the economy.    According to 
Nakagawa (1981), this rate cut was first planned in April, but delayed for political 
reasons.    This will be explained in detail below. By the time of implementation, it was 
way behind the curve, since the WPI inflation rate started to increase and industrial   10 
production started to show signs of recovery.   
The WPI inflation rate continued to accelerate, and reached a 11 percent by 
April 1973, while the CPI inflation rate reached 9.4% by April 1973.  In April 1973, 
the Bank of Japan raised its  policy interest rate (ODR) for the first time since the 
collapse of the Bretton-Woods system.   
The fact that the inflation rate rose sharply and exceeded 10% by summer 1973 
and there were some signs already a year earlier, the interest rate cut of June 1972 was a 
“mistake.”
10
Figure 2 (above) also shows that after the Middle East Crisis of October 1973, 
both the CPI and WPI inflation rates increased sharply.  The WPI inflation rate rose to 
near 35%, and CPI near 25% by spring 1974.  This  was the greatest peace time 
inflation for Japan. Due to a very high inflation rate, wages rose sharply in 1974 as well 
as 1973, in order to compensate for an increase in living costs.  Companies were 
enjoying profits from the demand stimulation of 1972 and 1973 (until the oil price 
shock, starting in October 1973).  The inflation spiral was in place from mid-1973 to 
1974.  Oil prices tripled from July 1973 to January 1974, with the selective embargo 
by OPEC countries. The sharp increase in imported oil prices aggravated the 
  By the same reasoning, the absence of monetary tightening until the CPI 
inflation rate nearing 10% in April 1973 showed that the Bank was too slow to respond. 
Reasons for this mistake based on political economy are presented below.   
                                                  
10  Hetzel (1999) provides the overview of Japanese monetary policy during the period 
from 1970 to 1998. He argues that the Bank of Japan had little room to make decisions 
until the fixed exchange rate was abandoned. It is true that under the Bretton-Woods 
regime (which ended in August 1971), there could not be totally autonomous monetary 
policy—independent from the US monetary policy—but since substantial capital 
controls were in place, so that the interest rate could be deviated from the United States. 
However, Japanese monetary policy could not be totally autonomous due to the balance 
of payment (BOP) constraints (see Ito (1992, Ch. 5)). In sum, monetary policy had a 
room to maneuver due to capital controls, but there was an overall BOP constraint. 
After August 1971, there were substantial policy options, including how much 
appreciation and fluctuation of the yen to be tolerated, how much inflation rate to be 
tolerated, how much capital liberalization to be allowed. Before the Smithsonian 
agreement—an attempt to fix the exchange rates at new rates with wider bands—the 
major countries were struggling how much appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar to be 
tolerated, and Japan was not an exception. The Smithsonian agreement, December 
1971 was a result of hard negotiation groping for new constellation of fixed exchange 
rates. Japan accepted more than 16% appreciation, but probably that was too little.   
Since there was a wide band, theoretically, monetary policy had room to maneuver 
under the Smithsonian regime. However, the yen had stuck at the ceiling, before Japan 
decided to abandon the Smithsonian regime in February 1973, one month ahead of 
European countries.    Hence, including the choice of abandoning the Smithsonian 
regime, there were policy choices between December 1971 and February 1973. It was 
certainly true that monetary policy was freed from US monetary policy after February 
1973.   11 
already-high-and-increasing inflation rate. 
While the CPI inflation rate above 20% was very high, the industrial 
production growth rate turned negative in 1974, as shown in Figure 3.    The real GDP 
growth rate became negative for the first time since 1955, when GDP statistics became 
available.  Table 3  shows GDP changes, quarter to quarter annualized rates, and 
year-on-year growth rates.    Table 4 shows the GDP growth rates.    The year 1974 was 
typical of stagflation—with a very high inflation rate with negative growth in output. 
Table 3 (above) and vertical lines in Figure 2 (above) show the timing of the 
monetary policy actions.  The interest rate (ODR) was raised five times in the nine 
month period starting April 1973.  However, there was no action in 1974.  Obvious 
questions are  why tightening did  not come earlier and why there was not more 
tightening in 1974.    We will answer these questions below 
Figure 4 shows movements of the CPI headline, CPI Core (excluding fresh 
food), CPI Core-Core (excluding food and energy-related), Since all three CPIs move 
together, it shows the role of energy was relatively small, in the run up to the high 
inflation period of 1974.    There are at a maximum a 5% point difference between Core 
and Core-Core, which is roughly the contribution of energy prices.   
Negative growth in 1974 and quite depressed wage increase in 1975 were the 
reason that the inflation rate came down in the second half of 1974 and throughout 1975. 
The WPI inflation rate fell below 5% in the spring of 1975, and by the end of 1975, the 
CPI inflation rate fell below 10%.  The great inflation of 1973-74 was over, with a 
heavy sacrifice in output activities in 1974. 
 
As explained above, the necessity of lowering the ODR by 50 basis points on June 24, 
1972 is highly questionable since the output had shown signs of recovery, and prices, 
particularly the WPI, also showed the sign of recovery.     
3.3. Why easing went too far: the Mistake of June 1972   
Bank of Japan (1986) and Nakagawa (1981), a former Bank senior official, 
describes what really went on behind the scene over this period.     
In April 1972, lowering the ODR was  considered as a part of an  anti-yen 
appreciation package of the government. Inside the BOJ, opinions were divided into 
two camps, one favoring lowering the ODR  and the other considering the rate cut 
unnecessary. Governor Sasaki maintained to the press that it was not necessary.  On 
May 10, Governor Sasaki met Prime Minister Sato, and the Governor was asked to 
consider lowering the ODR. On May 11, Governor Sasaki mentioned that the ODR 
would be lowered on the condition that the bank deposit rates will be lowered.    Inside   12 
the Bank, the proposal by the Governor to lower the rate, although with one technical 
condition, was considered to be a surprise turnaround of his position. (See BOJ (1986, 
p.381) for events on May 10 and 11.) 
It took more than a month to decide on the deposit rate, because the Ministry of 
Posts and Communication, which oversaw the Postal Saving System, was opposed to 
the deposit rate cut.    Finally, on June 23, the Postal saving deposit rates were lowered, 
and the Bank decided to lower the ODR.   
This episode reveals three problems.  First, the  Governor apparently was 
persuaded by Prime Minister on the interest rate decision.  Second, as all the 
private-sector interest rates were effectively linked to ODR, the ODR decision should 
seep into the system automatically.  However, bank deposit taking and Postal Saving 
deposit taking competed for household deposits.  Thus,  the  Ministry of Posts and 
Communication could effectively block the timely implementation.  Third, between 
the government plan of April and the actual implementation, two months had passed.  
The wisdom of lowering the interest rate should have been reassessed by the Bank of 
Japan as well as by the government in June.   
Nakagawa (1981) regrets that the Bank (including himself) had not been 
courageous enough to scrap the plan for the interest rate cut, since between April and 
June, economic activity picked up considerably.  He, however, thinks that once the 
political process—forcing the Postal Saving System to lower the deposit rate—had gone 
through the cycle, it was difficult to scrap it (Nakagawa (1981)).   
 
With  the government and the Bank of Japan pressing  for  domestic demand 
stimulation—again to avoid appreciation of the yen—in the first half of 1972, the wish 
was granted.  In the second half of 1972, the economy was growing full steam. The 
GDP growth rate was increasing in the 9% to 10% range in the second half of 1972, and 
rose above 10% in 1973 (recall Table 3); industrial production was increasing in the 10 
to 15 percent range from mid-1972 to end-1972.  The CPI inflation rate was above 
5.7% and WPI inflation rate was 6.3% in December 1972. It seems very natural that the 
Bank of Japan would react to raise the interest rate as early as October 1972, and at 
latest in December 1972. Why was the ODR not raised until April 1973?   
3.4. Why tightening did not come earlier 
The simple answer for a delayed reaction to inflation signals was again actual 
and potential political  pressure.  The economy indeed became strong and inflation 
pressure mounted by end-1972. The ODR was not raised until April 1973.   
The government decided to have a fiscal expansion package for the 1972 fiscal   13 
year budget (April 1972-March 1973) under Prime Minister Sato.  The 1973 fiscal 
year was also intended to maintain fiscal stimulus.  On July 7, 1972, Mr.  Tanaka 
became Prime Minister.  He won the Presidency of  the  Liberal Democratic 
Party—hence automatically guaranteed to become Prime Minister—on the platform of 
“Reconstruction of the Japanese Archipelago”—large public works to build a network 
of road and railroad infrastructure. He announced an additional fiscal spending program 
in August.    In October a supplementary budget and a second additional plan for a fiscal 
investment program was announced. He was very popular among the voters.  It was 
clear that he would be opposed to the rate hike. The Bank of Japan felt that it would not 
be possible to seek a rate hike.  On November 9, PM Tanaka reiterated a strong 
opposition to yen revaluation (BoJ, 1986, p.403) 
On November  13, the House of Representatives was dissolved, and on 
December 11, 1972, the general election took place. According to Bank of Japan (1986) 
and Nakagawa (1981), the Ministry of Finance told the Bank of Japan not to consider 
even the appearance of a policy change, during the election period.   
Right after the election, the budget discussion started in the Diet and the budget 
debate and votes continued until March 13, 1973.  Traditionally no monetary policy 
changes were made during the budget process, because that would affect the assumption 
of    budget.  This time, tradition was kept.   
On  February 14, 1973, the yen was floated (earlier than the European 
currencies)  as a result of heavy pressure for yen appreciation..  In March 1973, 
currency speculation became wide spread among the European currencies, resulting in 
free floating (the end of the Smithsonian).     
When the budget  process was over, and the fixed-exchange rate fetter was 
broken, the Bank of Japan got an approval for a rate hike.  On March 31, 1973, the 
approval was given (and implemented in two days later) in a chat between the Finance 
Minister and Governor in the corridor of the Diet. (Bank of Japan (1986).)   
Eight months of selecting a pro-spending Prime Minister, the dissolution of the 
Diet, and the budget process in the Diet explains the tardy implementation of the rate 
hike. There was an explicit approval of inflation if it would contribute to keep the 
nominal exchange rate within the approved range under the Smithsonian rate.  On 
August 9, 1972, MITI Minister Nakasone mentioned that he preferred  domestic 
inflation to yen appreciation. (BoJ, 1986, p. 401)  He said, “Japan is forced to choose 
between another yen revaluation and adjustment inflation. I think another yen 
revaluation should be definitely avoided; hence the economic activities should be 
stimulated,,,”  The inflation to avoid appreciation was named as “adjustment   14 
inflation.”  Indeed, one way to achieve real exchange rate appreciation—which may be 
required to prevent the trade surplus from increasing—is inflation.    Of course, inflation 
carries high costs of adjustment and distortions, and is an inferior policy compared to 
appreciation of the nominal exchange  rate.  But, this view  was not shared among 
politicians at the time.   
The step of the April 1973 rate hike, 75 basis point, was unusually high, 
probably reflecting the fact that the Bank was behind the curve.    Three other rate hikes, 
May 30 (+0.50); July 2 (+0.50); Aug 29 (+1.00) followed in a hurry (recall Table 4 and 
Figure 3 above).  However, the inflation rate continued rising.  With the news of the 
Middle East War breaking out on October 6, 1973, the inflation rate was already at a 
dangerously high level, the CPI at 15%, the WPI at 20%.  Inflation rates shot up after 
October—some direct result of increasing oil prices, and some indirect, but immediate, 
effects of speculative inventory hoarding and panic buying.  The Bank of Japan 
decided to raise ODR by 200 basis points on December 22, to put maximum pressure 
against inflation.   
The real interest rate remained negative from October 1972 until the mid-1975.  
The period from October 1972 to mid-1974 is characterized as widening the gap (more 
negative interest rate) and accelerating growth—a clear sign of being behind the curve. 
The real interest rate remained negative until mid-1975.  Tightening was too little too 
late throughout 1973. 
A crucial question is whether the Bank of Japan knew of the danger of 
postponing the rate hike and if so, whether the Bank sought after the rate hike even with 
risk of clashing with the government. BOJ (1986, pp. 409-411) described the inside 
thinking at the time. As the pace of inflation picked up, the Bank of Japan decided to 
push for the ODR hike in February 1973. The yen was floated on Feb 14 and 
appreciated substantially.  This removed one constraint on monetary policy.  However, 
this produced a political push for stimulus.  Again, it was still in the budget process, 
which was the politically sensitive time of the year to change the interest rate, so that 
the Bank of Japan tried to raise the reserve ratio, rather than the interest rate.  The 
increase in the reserve ratio was decided on March 2, and implemented on March 16. 
the Policy Board Chair noted, “The economy recently has become more active; prices 
are rising high; and corporate investment has become strong, …, in order to restrain the 
lending of financial institutions and manage aggregate demand appropriately, … the 
reserve ratio was decided to be raised, upon approval of the Minister of Finance.” The 
budget bill was passed in House of Rep. on March 13, and Prime Minister Tanaka 
admitted on March 16 the need for a policy switch to monetary tightening and fiscal   15 
adjustment for restraining aggregate demand.  This gave an approval for a policy 
action toward tightening.  The ODR hike was decided on March 31 (Sat) and 
implemented on April 2. “in order to restraint aggregate demand, ,,,”  In addition, 
quantitative restraint on lending from city banks was strengthened.   
There is not much of a trace of a  struggle between the Bank and the 
government prior to February 1973, reading through BOJ (1986).  The Bank was 
probably  too much self-restrained, or gave up on fighting against the Ministry of 
Finance as well as inflation. 
 
Let us have a recap on the Great Inflation episode.  There were two kinds of major 
mistakes committed in 1972-73:  too much easing, especially the June 1972 rate cut; 
and too little and too late tightening that started in April 1973.    Possible reasons for the 
mistake are as follows:   
3.5. Political Economy 
(a) Was the Bank of Japan targeting price stability?   
(b) Did the Bank of Japan fail to forecast the inflation rate pick up?   
(c)  Did the government put pressure on the Bank of Japan to stimulate the 
economy?   
(d) Did the Bank of Japan have courage to disagree? 
 
Answers in short are as follows based on the documents that examined the decision 
makings of the 1970s. 
  (a) No, the Bank of Japan did not put price stability as priority number one;   
  (b) Yes, the Bank of Japan knew prices were rising;   
  (c) Yes, the Bank of Japan was under pressure from the government to lower 
and keep low the interest rate; and could not resist the pressure 
  (d) No, the Bank of Japan did not fight back. 
Let us elaborate on these points below.   
 
Recall that the average inflation rate in Japan during the 1960s was 1.3% measured in 
WPI and 5.7% measured in CPI, and the economy did fine, growing at more than 10% a 
year and current account remaining surplus.  Thus,  it is not surprising that policy 
makers in 1971-72 were not alarmed by the CPI inflation rate at around 6%, especially 
when the WPI inflation rate was at around 0%.  The ODR was lowered four times 
between October 1970  and  July  1971, in the hope of stimulating domestic demand 
3.5.1. Lack of clear policy objective under the Managed Float   16 
further  and averting an appreciation of the yen.  These actions were under the 
Bretton-Woods regime, and quite understandable, if maintaining the exchange rate 
regime was the superior objective.   
After the Bretton-Woods regime collapsed, the Government and the Bank of 
Japan  decided to resist pressure for strong yen appreciation pressure by heavy 
intervention.  However, they underestimated the strength of the Japanese 
manufacturing industries.    By putting a policy objective to moderate yen appreciation, 
inflation was tolerated.     
 
The Bank of Japan law in the 1970s (until 1998) did not give the  Bank a policy 
objective of price stability or legal independence from the Ministry of Finance. The 
objective of the Bank in the Law was to “maximize the potential of the economy” and 
the Bank policy was under the direction of the Minister of Finance. On the other hand, 
the interest rate was supposed to be decided by the Policy Board (in charge of monetary 
policy)  of the Bank of Japan that includes appointments from outside the Bank.  
Theoretically, the Policy Board can make interest rate decisions which may be opposed 
by the government.    The Government has the power to replace Policy Board members 
as well as the Governor.    In reality, the Bank senior executives sought after a tacit prior 
approval from the government over interest rate decisions, and the Policy Board had 
become just an automatic approving body of the Bank executives.    Getting approval of 
the interest rate changes was tricky. It often depended on the relationship between 
Governor and the Minister of Finance, or between Governor and Prime Minister 
3.3.2. Lack of political independence 
Later in 1998, the Bank of Japan Law was revised.  Cargill, Hutchison, and 
Ito (1997; 2000) describes the history and legal details of the Bank of Japan laws, with a 
comparison of scores of legal independence between the old and new laws.   
What could the central bank have done in the absence  of  independence?  
Without independence, the Governor could be replaced at will of the government.  So 
can members of the Policy Board.    It was tradition that the change in monetary policy 
had to be negotiated with the Ministry of Finance (and Prime Minister), although by law 
the Policy Board at the BoJ could decide on its own power.    Even lowering the interest 
rate was difficult because the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications tended to 
oppose lowering the deposit rate.  Increasing the interest rate of course was much 
harder.  Could  the  Governor put his job on the  line  to disagree the government?  
Maybe that was not the Japanese style.   
   17 
4. Monetarist Rhetoric for Independence 
One lesson that the Bank of Japan learned from the mistake of creating high 
inflation in 1973–74 was to enhance de facto  independence.  To develop  more 
theoretical underpinning for controlling inflation was one, and to assert the danger of 
inflation, when met with pressure from the government, was another.  If the future 
inflation can be credibly warned with some indicators, that would be persuasive.   
The Bank of Japan published a study in 1975 on the importance of monetary 
aggregate, M2+CDs, in predicting future inflation and output, and announced a new 
monetary policy procedure in 1978.
11    Beginning in July 1978, the Bank of Japan had 
made it a regular procedure to announce a “forecast” of the growth rate of the average 
outstanding balance of money (M2+CDs) relative to the same period in the previous 
year, at the beginning of the quarter.    For example, the forecast for monetary growth in 
the first quarter of 1985 over the first quarter of 1984 was announced at the beginning 
of the first quarter of 1985.    There are two important features for this procedure.    First, 
the forecast included the will of the Bank of Japan:    “… the policy actions of the Bank 
of Japan iself are included in the determination of these forecasts, and in this sense the 
forecasts represent increases in the money supply that the Bank of Japan is willing to 
permit.” (Suzuki, (1987; p.331))
12
If the monetary growth rate is an indicator for warning future inflation, monetarism 
rhetoric can be used in the debate against those who argue otherwise.  Although the 
Bank of Japan did not seem to use actively the monetarism rhetoric against political 
pressure, the monetary indicator may have contributed to confidence among the Bank 
economists internally.   
  Second,  three quarters, out of four, are already 
history in the announced annual growth rate.  The forecast represents an average of 
three quarters’ realized monetary growth and current quarter’s projected monetary 
growth. Therefore, the will to change in money is concentrated on the current quarter. 
At the time, a monetarist thinking had a strong influence among central bank 
researchers as well as academics. The Bank of Japan must have thought that there was a 
high correlation between M2＋CDs and future nominal GNP, and that it could relatively 
easily control M2＋CDs via monetary policy instruments. Thus, using M2+CDs as an 
intermediate target, the Bank could target low inflation rate and full-employment output 
at the same time. 
The new procedure had rhetoric of distinct monetarism flavor.  In fact, Milton 
                                                  
11  See Bank of Japan, (1975, 1988) for their description of the procedure and assessments. 
12  See Ito (1989) for more detailed descriptions and examination of the Bank of Japan “forecasts” of 
monetary aggregate growth rates.   18 
Friedman (1985a) praised that the Bank of Japan followed monetarist rule that he had 
advocated.
13
A decade later, Suzuki (1985) observed that the money-supply growth rate was 
gradually reduced, so was the nominal-GNP growth rate—but without interfering with 
the real-GNP growth rate; moreover, fluctuations in the money supply have decreased.
  By keeping the monetary growth rate steady, say at  k%, then output 
would be stabilized and the inflation rate would be kept low (near k%). The Bank of 
Japan has been least monetarist central bank in its rhetoric, the most monetarist in its 
policy. It has also achieved the best results. However, Suzuki (1985) was more cautious. 
He branded Japanese monetary policy of the time as “eclectic gradualism,” which is a 
position between Keynesian fine tuning and a monetarist k%-growth rule.   
14
Was the successful Bank of Japan policy a k% rule? According to Ito (1989, 1992), 
the Bank of Japan did not practice the k%-growth rule preached by monetarists in the 
following details of implementation.  If the k% rule had been implemented, then 
higher-than-forecasted growth in money should have been followed by lower-than-trend 
growth in money, to maintain the long-run growth rate of k% by offsetting the upward 
deviation. 
 
This means that the gradual decrease in the money-supply growth rate reduced inflation 
without reducing economic growth, that is, no tradeoff between inflation and potential 
growth. 
However, it was found that when the actual monetary growth rate deviated from its 
forecast rate, the target rate of the following period (quarter) was most likely to be 
adjusted toward the actual growth rate. That is, if the actual growth rate was higher than 
the target rate in quarter T, the target rate of quarter T  ＋  1 was higher than the target 
rate in quarter T.    In addition, the target was unbiased in the sense that the mean of the 
forecast error was zero—the “forecasts” were rational expectations. 
The observed facts are not consistent with monetarist practice. If the k% rule had 
been taken seriously, the target rate for quarter T  ＋  1 should move in the opposite 
direction of the deviation so that k% growth in the money stock could be maintained in 
the long run. That is, if the actual rate was higher than the target rate in quarter T, then 
the target rate of quarter T  ＋  1 should be lower than the target rate in quarter T, in 
order to compensate for the unexpected increase (see Ito (1989)). 
Thus, despite praise from monetarists, the monetary policy of the Bank of Japan 
cannot be judged to have been practicing monetarism as defined by the k% rule. 
                                                  
13  Milton Friedman (1985b) was very critical of the Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker 
in its implementation of 1979 policy to target the growth rate of monetary aggregate (M1) in an 
attempt to fight inflation. 
14  See also Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997: ch. 3) for the updated discussion.   19 
However, the fact that the inflation rate was brought down gradually without affecting 
the trend growth rate was praised as a successful implementation of monetary policy 
with monetary aggregate emphasis (see Suzuki (1985, 1987)).  It is conceivable that 
the monetary growth emphasis from 1978 to mid-1980s gave some weapon of rhetoric 
in fighting against pressure from the government (see Ito (1992, chapter 5)).   
The emphasis on monetary growth rate was more or less terminated after 1987 
when the monetary aggregate growth rate became  much higher than forecasts 
consistently, most likely from the instability of money demand due to rapid financial 
liberalization at the time.   
 
5.  No Great Inflation in 1979-80 
Another oil crisis came at the end of the 1970s.  If the oil crisis was a culprit of the 
Great Inflation earlier, which I have refuted already, the same would happen.  If the 
second oil crisis was managed—and indeed it was the case shown below—that would 
strengthen the case that the Bank of Japan made a mistake at the first time.   
5.1. Overview 
Figure 5 shows the interest rates (ODR and call rate) as well as the inflation 
rates (CPI and WPI) for the period from January 1976 to December 1980.  The CPI 
inflation rate had fallen slowly to the five percent level by end 1979.  The economy 
was back to normal from 1978 to the beginning of 1979.  The economy showed the 
sign of a boom by end-1978. The dollar had a confidence crisis in mid-1978. The dollar 
decline (yen rise) occurred for several months, but reversed after October 1978.  This 
time, expansionary monetary policy was not taken.    The WPI started to rise in the 
spring of 1979.  This time, WPI movement was noted as a good forward indicator of 
CPI inflation.  Although the CPI inflation rate was still stable at 3% range, the ODR 
was hiked in April 17, 1979, and again in July 24, 1979, as shown in Table 5. The WPI 
continued to rise, although CPI was still lagging behind during the summer of 1979.  
The oil prices started to rise in the summer, and accelerated further after the hostage 
crisis at the US Embassy in Iran in October 1979. 
As CPI inflation rate started to rise after October 1979, the Bank of Japan 
decided to raise the ODR further.  The ODR was hiked again in November 2, 1979.  
The inflation rate continued to rise quickly.     
The Bank of Japan sought and obtained an approval from the government to 
raise the policy interest rate, ODR, again in February and March of 1980. This was the 
first time that the Bank of Japan was able to raise the interest rate during the budget 
process.    The Bank could not respond quickly due to the moratorium during the budget   20 
process during the Great Inflation episode as described in preceding section.  So, the 
fact it was achieved brought a tremendous joy to the Bank of Japan policy makers.  
The reason that enabled the Bank to persuade politicians and the Ministry of Finance 
was  high  inflation experience of 1973-74.  The Bank convinced the Ministry and 
politicians of the importance of timely monetary policy actions.  Many scholars 
including Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (1997) describe that the Bank of Japan achieved a 
de facto independence from the government by 1979.   
The CPI inflation rate was kept under 10 percent a year, and the real interest 
rate (call minus CPI inflation rate) remained positive.  The effects of the second oil 
crisis was over by end-1980.   
 
In January 1979, Governor mentioned that no more relaxing of monetary policy would 
come, and the policy stance was changed to “neutral.”  In March 1979, OPEC raised 
oil prices by more than 10 percent.   The WPI started to increase sharply from January 
to March.     
5.2. Quick start of tightening, April, July, and November 1979 
With the first sign of the WPI increase, the Bank sought to raise the interest rate 
(Nakagawa, 1981, pp. 111-126).  First, on March 20, Governor Morinaga mentioned 
that BOJ switched to a cautionary stance.  In early April, Governor Morinaga told 
Prime Minister Ohira and Finance Minister that the BOJ wish to raise ODR. They were 
in favor, but some other cabinet members were not in favor.    PM Ohira understood the 
BOJ position.    The ODR hike was decided on April 16 (implemented on April 17). 
Nakagawa (1981: pp. 116-126) also mentioned that the Bank understood that 
early actions were needed due to lags in the monetary policy process.  The WPI rose 
sharply from March to May, 1979, mainly due to energy prices.  Business complained 
of monetary tightening, arguing that monetary policy was ineffective against imported 
inflation.  The BOJ rebutted that  the imported price increase would raise the CPI 
eventually and it will start the process of inflationary spiral, and real activity was strong.  
In addition, Germany raised the interest rate at the end of March. The lessons of the 
1972-74 episode must have been learned and applied here.   
The Economic Planning Agency disagreed  with the BOJ judgment, saying 
there were differences between the first oil crisis and 1979: the labor market is soft; 
money supply growth rate is lower; corporations are cautious; the utilization rate is 
lower; the exchange rate is floating; and the government is cautious. BOJ rebutted that it 
was worse due to a large amount government bonds that had been issued between 1973 
and 1979; and the yen has depreciated; and oil prices started to rise early.   21 
In July 1979, another ODR hike was realized.    Nakagawa (1981: pp. 126-134) 
explained this hike as follows.  OPEC raised the oil prices in July.  At the Tokyo 
summit, restraining demand was agreed.  Governor Morinaga met PM Ohira, the day 
before flying to the BIS meeting, and proposed a rate hike, and got a nod immediately.  
Business activity was considered to be strong. The government, especially the Ministry 
of Finance, was cautious, and argued that the timing could be August or September. 
However, Governor Morinaga had  got a nod from Prime Minister on its personal 
relationship, and won the debate against the Ministries.   
The government still insisted that “in order to suppress aggregate demand” was 
inappropriate for the reason  of  the  rate hike. The BOJ explained the action: 
“demand-supply became tight. … Money supply continues to increase and money 
tightening is not felt.  Hence, in order to avoid making imported inflation into 
home-made inflation, it is absolutely necessary to raise the official discount rate.” 
(Nakagawa, 1981, p. 129)  Upon agreement between MOF and BOJ, the ODR was 
decided to be raised on July 23, and implemented July 24.   
The ODR was further raised in November 1979.  WPI continued to rise (a 
large jump in September), the yen depreciated (223 yen/dollar at end-September and 
240 yen/dollar in October. The House of Rep. election took place on October 7. The 
LDP lost many seats.  Mr Ohira remained as Prime Minister, but only after a fierce 
fight and split voting in the House of Representatives (the so-called 40-day fight). The 
government was in chaos. The BOJ determined to raise ODR early, and this time, there 
was  no objection from MOF, but the Bank waited until the next  PM was to be 
determined (since there was no precedent of changing ODR during a general election or 
before a new cabinet is formed).  The BOJ decided to raise ODR on November 1 and 
implemented it on November 2.   
 
After the Nov 2 ODR hike, inflation worries continued.  On Nov 4, 1979 the Iranian 
hostage crisis (US Embassy was attacked and diplomats were taken hostage) occurred 
(and hostages were not released until Jan 1981), and the oil market conditions continued 
to tighten.  On  December 27, Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviets. As the political 
events multiply, the oil prices continue to rise.     
5.3. Interest rate hike in February and March 1980 
Domestic output activity was increasing, and steel and utilities prices were 
rising.  In February  1980, WPI inflation  rate became near 20%.  In view of these 
developments, newly appointed Governor Maekawa decided to raise the interest rate.  
However, this was the time of the budget process in the Diet.  The interest rate hike   22 
was opposed by the Ministry of Finance on grounds of timing. I conjecture that the BOJ 
argued against the MOF with the logic that the missed opportunity would result in a 
repeat of the high inflation of 1973-74. 
Governor Maekawa met Prime Minister Ohira in early February and requested 
an ODR hike.  Prime Miniter Ohira promised a reply within a week. Prime Miniter 
Ohira gave a go-ahead in the replay. On February 18, 1980, it was decided to raise ODR 
by 1%, and implemented the day later.   
On March 18, the ODR was hiked again by 175 basis point. Between February 
and March, it was observed that CPI started to rise sharply.  The government also 
changed the priority toward fighting inflation. In the United States, the interest rate was 
raised to near 20 percent to fight inflation in early 1980.
15
In the end, Japan fared well in the second oil crisis. The CPI inflation rate 
never reached 10%, and the real interest rate measured by call rate over the CPI 
inflation rate remained positive.    The worst of inflation was over by the summer 1980, 
and the ODR was lowered in August and November 1980.  By the end of 1980, the 
WPI inflation rate came down to 10%, and the CPI inflation rate decelerated to 7%.     
    
“Lessons” of the 1973-74 were fully utilized by the BOJ to persuade MOF and 
the  Prime  Minister for early actions on monetary tightening.  Raising ODR, twice, 
during the budget process was a strong indication that BOJ had  achieved  de facto 
independence.  However, still it relied on the understanding of the Prime Minister, and 
the  trust between Governor  and the  Prime Minister, rather than a legal framework.  
Credibility and de facto independence seem to be subject to who is Governor and who is 
Prime Minister. This precarious relationship would continue until the revision of the 
Bank of Japan law in 1998.   
 
6.  Econometric Analysis 
6.1 Purpose 
In the narrative, it was established that the Bank of Japan made a mistake prior to and 
during the first oil crisis, while the Bank skillfully managed the second oil crisis. In this 
section, econometric analysis will be employed to quantify this narrative. A modified 
Taylor rule equation during the period when the Bank of Japan was considered to be 
successful will be estimated, and the fitted values with estimated coefficients from 
well-run period will be applied to the presumed-mistake periods. 
16
                                                  
15  Paul Volcker took over Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 1979 to fight inflation with 
determined manner.   
     
16  For Taylor rule, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), and Taylor (1999) to name a few.    See 
Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000), Kuttner and Posen (2004), and Ahearn (2002) for application of   23 
The Taylor rule (and its variants) should be used with care when it is used more 
than  a description of the response function of the central bank  or for normative 
interpretations.
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In Japan’s case, after the mistake of 1972-74, the Bank of Japan gained de facto 
independence by reminding the government of the sorry episode in 1972-73.
  If it is to be used in the normative spin, it is absolutely important to 
find a time period when conduct and consequences of monetary policy conduct are 
impeccable.   
18  The 
Bank of Japan successfully lowered the inflation rate from 10 percent in 1975 to 2 
percent in early-1980s.
19  Once the inflation rate was brought down to the level near 2%, 
the monetary policy entered a happy state of maintaining low and stable inflation rate.  
Monetary policy during the economic boom toward the end of the 1980s was a bit 
controversial in retrospect, because it allowed an asset price bubble to form, which later 
burst.   However, in the sense of CPI price stability, the second half of the 1980s had a 
good performance.  In the 1990s, there is some question raised by several authors 
whether  loosening of monetary policy after the bubble burst, 1991-92, was quick 
enough to prevent a sharp decline in output after 1993.
20
With the above discussions in mind, I take the period from January 1982 to 
December 1995 as a benchmark period that can be regarded as a successful period in 
CPI inflation stability.    The benchmark Taylor rule will be estimated for this period. 
  However, the Bank of Japan 
had controlled the interest rate in an attempt of stabilizing inflation and output until the 
financial system falls into a serious crisis, with some failure of medium size regional 
bank, and the official discount rate being lowered to 0.5% in September 1995.  Soon 
after the interest rate was lowered to 0.5% in September 1995, the Bank of Japan lost its 
grip on inflation, partly due to the zero bound of the nominal interest rate and partly due 
to near deflation.     
Several provisos should be mentioned at this point.  First, the policy rate was 
the official discount rate (ODR), and many market interest rates were tied to the ODR. 
Second, there were monetary policy measures other than the policy rate. The so-called 
“window guidance”—constraints on bank lending by  moral suasion—was playing a 
major role. The reserve requirement was also used. Hence, the interest rate was not the 
                                                                                                                                                  
the Taylor rule to the Japanese case.     
17  Taylor (2009, FAQ section) insists that the Taylor rule is normative from the beginning. Others, 
including Orphanides (2003a,b,c), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998, 1999) and Ito and 
Mishkin(2006) are rather cautious on the normative interpretation. 
18  See Cargill, Hutchison and Ito(1997) for such an interpretation. 
19  See, for example, Friedman (1985) and Ito (1992: ch. 5). 
20  See Ahearne (2002), Clouse et al. (2000), Ito and Mishkin (2006), Jinushi, et al. (2000), Kuttner 
and Posen (2004) for the discussion of Japan’s monetary policy in the early to mid-1990s.     24 
only variable that represents monetary policy. Third, many market infrastructures and 
economic structures went through changes during the 1970s and 1980s.  Financial 
liberalization particularly progressed in the second half of the 1980s. Attempts are made 
to take into account these issues, but treatment is admittedly far from perfect.   
After examining the estimated coefficients and the deviations of fitted value 
from actual value within the sample, the out-of-sample backcasting will be conducted to 
see whether the Bank of Japan would have behaved differently in the 1970s.  In 
particular, the mistake of monetary policy creating the Great Inflation of 1972-74 will 
be examined in light of the estimated Taylor rule of 1982-95. This exercise will answer 
the following question: Suppose that the Bank of Japan in 1972-74 (the “mistake” 
years) had reacted to macro variables in the manner they had in 1982-95. How much the 
counterfactual interest rate would have been hiked compared to the actual interest rate. 
If it could be shown that the counterfactual interest rate would have been much higher 
than actual, then the prudent Bank of Japan a la 1982-95 would have mitigated the 
inflation problem in 1972-74.   
The typical Taylor rule equation is as follows:   
 
      
 
Where  t i   denotes the nominal policy interest rate; 
f r   the natural real interest rate; 
* π   the target inflation rate;  t π   is the inflation rate;  * y yt −   is the output gap. In the 
original Taylor (1993), both  βwere assumed to be 0.5, and 
f r .and  * π   were both 
assumed to be 2.  Here, as in the literature β  will be estimated using data in the 
benchmark period.  In the implementation of estimating this equation, the following 
specification is used.   
   
 
The left hand side becomes the real interest rate at time t. There are several departures 
from the usual Taylor rule regression in the literature.    First, since the decision making 
is done on a monthly  basis (rarely two policy rate changes in the same month), a 
monthly model is highly recommended.  GDP gap will not be available on the monthly 
basis, so that the industrial production will be used as a measure of output.  The 
industrial production gap will be defined and used in place of GDP.  Second, efforts 
will be made to obtain data that were available at the time of decision making, although 
the data used in the regression are not exactly the real time data. Third, since the 
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equilibrium real rate 
f r is difficult to calculate, the equilibrium nominal rate is to be 
estimated as a constant term of in the model.     
 
6.2 Data 
Several variables have to be carefully defined for the Taylor-rule type econometric 
application.  First, the output gap (output deviation from its potential) and inflation gap 
(inflation deviation from its target) have to be defined in the spirit of “real time data”, 
that is data that were known at the time of policy was decided. The importance of using 
real time data are particularly emphasized by Orphanides (2003, a, b, c).    For example, 
use of the original data at time t should be used instead of later revisions, including base 
year change or preliminary to final.  Second, any detrending, or estimating and taking 
out potential output, should be carried out with the data only up to time t.    Third, since 
data collection and data disclosure takes time, at the time of monetary policy decision in 
month t, available data of Industrial Production and CPI are not those of month t, but 
either month t-1 or even t-2.
21  Although official data may be available only for t-2, 
various other economic variables can be used to guess what would be announced later.
22
Since we attempt to build a monthly model, GDP cannot be used as a variable 
for output gap.    In place of GDP, Industrial Production will be used.    The base year of 
Industrial Production is changed every 5 years. If we had picked up data from the 
present data base, it would be a series of current estimation method, and different from 
the variable that was known at the time of decision making in the 1970s to the 1990s.  
Therefore, the original Industrial Production data set is collected from historical series 
that were available at the time of decision making.
 
So, we assume that the data that the Bank of Japan knows at month t would be 
Industrial Production and CPI of month t-1. 
23 * y yt −   For the output gap  , a 
deviation of the Industrial Production from its linear trend, which is known at time t, is 
                                                  
21  The Policy Board Meetings (in charge of monetary policy decisions) became regularly 
scheduled meetings (with the meeting dates being pre-announced) under the revised 
Bank of Japan law which took effect in April 1998. Earlier, monetary policy meetings 
were called upon when needed. However, we assume even without prescheduled 
meeting, the Bank staff makes a decision to call a meeting or not at least every month.       
22  The CPI of month t becomes available in month t+2.    One option is to use the CPI inflation rate 
on the right hand side the variable of two months ago.    However, with information of CPI of Tokyo 
Area which is announced in month t+1, one can guess the national CPI with some accuracy before 
their disclosure.    Therefore, the CPI on the right hand side is the inflation rate of t-1. 
23  Admittedly, this is not “genuine” real time data, since original documents, such as every issue of 
Monthly Report, of the Bank of Japan are not checked against the old data base.    The minutes of 
the monetary policy meetings were not kept before 1998.     26 
used.
 24
For the inflation measure (π),  the year on year change of headline-CPI is 
used.
  Obviously future path of industrial production is not known, the trend has to 
be estimated using only the past date at the time of decision making.  The industrial 
production gap was estimated from January 1971 to December 2008. 
25  The base year of the CPI and weights of goods and services in the 
consumption basket are revised every five years in Japan.  As CPI of a new base year 
becomes available, the Bank of Japan and the government starts using the new CPI for 
their decision making.  The real-time CPI is constructed with choosing the 
headline-CPI of the base year that was in place.
26
The target inflation rate is also difficult to determine.  The inflation rate 
during the 1960s was much higher than later period.  It is assumed that the target 
inflation rate, π* was 4% from January 1971 to December 1977.  As the Bank of 
Japan became serious in lowering the inflation rate in 1978 by adopting the monetary 
aggregate “forecast” (see Ito (1989)), it is assumed that the target rate was gradually 
(1/24 percentage point a month) lowered from 4 percent in December 1977 to 2 percent 
by December 1981. The target inflation rate was again lowered gradually from 2 percent 
in December 1992 to 1 percent in December 1998, and has stayed at 1 percent since 
then.   
   
 
6.3 Estimation 
Based on the discussion above, the equation to be estimated is the following:   
                                                  
24  The output gap is the residual in the log-linear trend regression using data of the preceding ten 
years [t-119, t].    Extract the residual at t.    By multiplying by 100, the percentage deviation from 
the trend line is stored.    Then, repeat the procedure (i.e., rolling regression) from January 1971 to 
December 2008. 
25  The headline inflation was most often mentioned in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. When the exit 
condition from quantitative easing was mentioned in March 2001, it was defined in the CPI 
excluding fresh food (but including energy prices).    Since the 2000s are not a period for analysis in 
this paper, the headline CPI is used throughout this paper. Otherwise the inflation rate to be analyzed 
should be switched from headline inflation to CPI excluding food May 2001 with the change in the 
base year as well. Another potential adjustment that is ignored in this paper is the introduction of 
consumption tax (a form of VAT) in April 1989 and tax rate increase in April 1997.    When the 3% 
consumption tax was introduced in April 1989, some of excise and other indirect taxes were 
abolished, so that the net effect on the consumer prices were much less than 3%.    Ito and Mishkin 
(2006) argued that the year on year inflation rate due to consumption tax was 1.3% for April 1989 – 
March 1990, and 1.6% for April 1997 – March 1998.    However, no adjustment is made in this 
paper for consumption tax increases, on the assumption that the Bank of Japan was alert on inflation 
even due to the consumption tax increases, as inflation due to consumption tax increases may trigger 
second round inflation.     
26  As in Industrial Production, the what we collected from old-base-year CPI may not be genuine 
real-time CPI.    Original documents at the time of monetary policy board meeting were not checked 
against our data.    Minutes were not kept, and often the meeting was called suddenly. In the sense 
what we call real-time data here are what we believe to the best approximation of the real time data.       27 
 
   
 
Where the constant term c will be interpreted as the long run real interest rate. The 
inflation and industrial production are lagged once due to observation lag for the central 
bank.  Since  the inflation rate is defined as year-on-year, there will be serial correlation 
in the residuals.  Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) is used to estimate 
equation (1).
27
The sample period of estimation is from January 1982 to December 1995. The 
choice of this time period is discussed earlier in this section.     
 
Table 6-1 shows the estimation results.  Both inflation gap and output gap 
have statistically significant estimates with correct sign.    The magnitude of coefficients 
are smaller than original Taylor assumption of 0.5.  If the inflation rate rises 1 
percentage point, the nominal interest rate rises 1.34 percentage point, since the “real” 
interest rate responds by 0.34 percentage point.  If the output gap moves positively 
(over heating) by 1 percentage point, then the nominal interest rate rises by 0.127 
percent, assuming no change in the inflation rate. 
Figure 6-1 shows the actual and fitted values in the sample period, and their 
difference, the residual of the equation.  Assuming that the fitted value can be 
interpreted as a desirable path, the figure suggests the following interpretation:  The 
monetary policy was too tight (actual>fitted) in 1985 and 1986, while the monetary 
policy was too loose in 1988 and 1989.    The two years of 1988 and 1989 are known to 
be the last stage of the real estate bubble.  Several authors have suggested that the 
Bank of Japan made a mistake in these years allowing the bubble to form, thus the asset 
prices should have been included in deciding monetary policy.  (See Okina and 
Shiratsuka (2002, 2004))  However, as  Figure 6-1 suggests, even a  plain CPI 
Taylor-rule would have flagged loose monetary policy as being too loose in these two 
years.   
 
6.4 Out of Sample Backcasting 
Now that we have reasonable estimates of the modified Taylor rule for the period in 
which the monetary policy can be regarded as desirable on average, we can evaluate the 
monetary policy of other periods in question.  We are particularly interested in the 
                                                  
27  For the instruments, c, πt-2-π*, yt-2-y*, dyent-1, doilt-1 are used, where dyent is the year-on-year 
change of the yen/dollar rate in month t and doilt is the year-on-year change of the oil prices in 
month t.   
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“mistake” in the early 1970s, when the inflation rate rose above 20 percent.  Use the 
estimated coefficients of Table 6-1, and plug the data of 1972, then we obtain the 
counterfactual call rate during the period in question.
28
One  should be careful in interpreting these findings.  The  path of the 
counterfactual call rate is not desirable path.  If the desirable path of 1972 had been 
implemented, then the actual inflation rate would have been lower, so that the interest 
rate in 1973 would not have been so high.  The desirable rate should be interpreted as 
the rate that, given the actual history up to t-1, would have been the desirable call rate in 
month t.   
  Figure 6-2 shows the actual 
and counterfactual nominal call rate.  Obviously, the counterfactual nominal rate, i.e., 
the desirable call rate would have been much higher than the actual call rate.  The 
desirable interest rate would have been around 36 percent when the actual rate was 12 
percent.  This exercise shows numerically  what  we have already established in the 
narrative.  In the year after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, monetary policy 
made a mistake.  When the first oil crisis came, the inflation rate was already high.  
With the additional shock of oil price increases, the inflation rate rose sharply, 
exceeding 20 percent. The magnitude of the mistake was more than 20 percentage 
points in the call rate.   
Figure 6-3 shows the similarly generated desirable rate for the period of 
1978-82, the period that encompasses the second oil crisis.  This shows that the 
counterfactual interest rate was not much different (up to 1.5 percentage point) from the 
actual rate in 1979-1980, the oil crisis years.  This confirms the narrative that the 
second oil crisis was handled much better than the first one.     
 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigated the great inflation of Japan, 1973-74, when the CPI inflation 
rate reached almost 30% a year, and the WPI inflation rate higher than that.  The 
period coincided with the first oil crisis.  Close examinations revealed that the major 
mistakes were committed before the oil crisis.    Namely, easing in 1971-72 went to far, 
stimulating the economy too much, and tightening in 1973 came too little too late.    The 
CPI inflation rate was already above 10% when the Middle East War broke out in 
October 1973.  The oil price increase and the sense of panic for not obtaining the 
energy resources caused further increases in prices. 
                                                  
28  One obtains counterfactual “real” interest rate by the procedure, and then by adding the inflation 
rate, the counterfactual nominal interest rate is obtained.     29 
The reasons for the too much easing and too little tightening from 1971 to 1973 
include  several political economy reasons as well as economic reasons.  First, too 
much attention and efforts were devoted to prevent the yen appreciation under the 
Smithsonian regime.  Some politicians openly voiced preference to inflation over 
nominal appreciation of the yen.    Second, the Bank of Japan was not independent from 
the government. The Prime Minister exerts pressure on the Bank to lower the interest 
rate or to prevent the interest rate hike.  The timing of implementation  was also 
influenced by the political agenda and schedule.  It was commonly thought that the 
interest rate cannot be changed during the  budget discussion in the Diet, that is, 
December to March.    Third, the Bank of Japan did not fight the government enough to 
push for the right decisions.  Self restraints were applied not to cause conflict against 
the Ministry of Finance.   
The second oil crisis was handled much better than the great inflation 
experience.  The CPI remained lower than 10%, and the real interest rate was kept 
positive.  The interest rate was raised as soon as the WPI started to increase in 1978. 
The ODR was raised even when the budge was still being discussed in the Diet.  The 
Bank gained de facto  independence using the logic that without swift actions, the 
mistake of high  inflation would be repeated.  Prime Minister Ohira was also quite 
respectful to Governor Maekawa for the Bank’s judgment and decisions.   
The modified (monthly) Taylor rule was specified and estimated using the data 
of the period from January 1982 to December 1995, a period of relative success in 
achieving low and stable inflation rate.  Then the estimate coefficients of the equation 
were applied to the data of the mistake period, 1972-1975.  The desirable interest rate 
would have been some 20 percentage point higher than the actual rate.    When the same 
procedure was applied to the second oil crisis period, 1978-82, then it was shown that 
the desirable rate would not have been much different from the actual rate.  The 
exercise confirms the conclusion of the narrative.  The mistake of Great Inflation 
started well before the onset of the first oil crisis, October 1973.    The interest rate was 
way too low before October 1973 and after October 1973.       
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1st Oil CrisisFigure 3: Industrial Production Index, changes over 12 months 
 
 Figure 4: CPI Inflation rates: Headline, Core (Excluding Fresh Food), 












































































































































































CPI headline CPI Core CPI CoreCoreFigure 5 
 














































































































































































CPI inflation WPI inflation ODR Call Rate
ODR cut
ODR cut Iranian 
Hostage 
ODR hikeTable 1: Three episodes of high inflation 
 
Three episodes of high inflation 
    CPI (%)  WPI (%) 
1917  22.7  25.8 
1918  34.6  31.0 
1919  33.0  22.5 
        
1945  NA 51.1 
1946  NA 364.5 
1947  NA 195.9 
1948  83.0  165.6 
1949  31.7  63.3 
        
1974  23.3  31.4 
 
Notes: Author’s calculation. 
Data Source: See Ito (1997) 

















1972.01 4.1 -0.6 1.3 25.1 312.23
1972.02 4.5 0.0 3.0 25.3 304.98
1972.03 5.3 0.2 3.9 26.1 302.44
1972.04 5.0 0.4 3.8 26.2 303.56
1972.05 5.2 0.4 8.3 25.5 304.44
1972.06 4.8 0.6 6.5 26.6 303.68 interest rate cut
1972.07 5.0 0.7 5.9 27.1 301.11
1972.08 5.9 0.9 8.3 26.4 301.10
1972.09 3.9 2.2 8.1 26.9 301.10
1972.10 4.4 3.2 10.6 27.8 301.10
1972.11 5.1 5.0 11.4 28.5 301.10
1972.12 5.7 6.3 14.7 26.5 301.23
1973.01 6.7 7.6 17.1 26.1 301.96
1973.02 7.0 9.3 16.9 26.8 279.48
1973.03 8.7 11.6 16.5 26.9 265.26











fixedTable 3:   
 
  
Growth Rates, quarter to quarter & year to year 
q-q y-y

























tighteningTable 4:    Monetary Policy Actions and critical questions 
 
  
Official Discount Rate %
Date 1970-1975






Was this necessary? --> 1972.06.24 -0.50 4.25
Was this too late?    --> 1973.04.02 0.75 5.00







1975.10.24 -1.00 6.50Table 5: Monetary Policy 1977-1980 
Date








1980.02.19 1.00 7.25 ←ODR increase during budget process
1980.03.19 1.75 9.00 ←ODR increase during budget process
1980.08.20 -0.75 8.25
1980.11.06 -1.00 7.25




  Table 6-1.    Monthly Taylor Rule, 1982-1995 
 
Equation  (1):  Sample:  1982M01  1995M12 
   Coefficient Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  3.723  0.130  28.54  0.000 
πt-πt
*  0.336  0.165  2.03  0.044 
yt-yt
*  0.127  0.021  5.97  0.000 
              
R-squared  0.366 Mean dependent var  3.333851 
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